Home ● Services ● Experience ● Articles ● Quicklaw Articles ● Book review● Publications ● Work in Progress ● The Media ● Link Sites ● Contact● Your Suggestions
Says authors of wrongful convictions should be held personally accountable
Book Review: Watt, D., & Fuerst, M. (1989).
Tremeear's
Criminal Code. Toronto: Carswell. 1368 pages.
|
The Lawyers Weekly In defence of incivility [back to top of page]
By Munyonzwe Hamalengwa There has been of late much reporting about a loss of civility among lawyers in Canada. There is not much said about whether this condition has any redeeming qualities at all. Because nothing is said about what civility used to feel and look like in the past, new-age lawyers are not enlightened as to what civility is all about. How can we recapture that illusive creature? Do we need it under present conditions? Do we need a new civility rather than harking back to the old and now unknowable civility? Who is being protected from the alleged new incivility? Who is to benefit from the new civility? It is my thesis that the perceived incivility among lawyers is a result of the changing composition of the legal profession specifically and the broader shifting legal, political, economic, cultural and social dynamics in general - that this new incivility is actually positive, must be welcomed and properly harnessed, rather than suppressed. The attempt to brand all perceived and actual incivility as negative must be resisted at all costs. Incivility is seen as a condition occurring only in the legal profession, particularly among lawyers. This is not the case. It cuts across all professions and walks of life. It is also a worldwide phenomenon. Have you watched parliamentary debates in the House of Commons amongst our esteemed governors lately? Or the noise emanating from the council chambers at City Hall and Queen's Park? If there is collapse in civility there, do we expect the other professions to be any different? Do you remember the slugfest that took place in early 2000 between an Alberta trial Judge and a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada? The trial judge felt that the decision written by one Supreme Court justice, in which others concurred, libelled him. He wrote letters to the papers in which he poured uncivil venom on the culprit Supreme Court justice. As you recall, all hell broke loose. Incivility was clearly evident within the judiciary. Lawyers learn from their leaders and superiors. And have you read the dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court of the U.S. in Bush v. Gore, where the majority of that court gave the presidency after the 2000 elections to George W. Bush? Talk about incivility among the judiciary sinking to the lowest level! Those judges literally accused each other of intellectual dwarfism. And I cherished it. With that incivility in the so-called most powerful court in the world and whose decisions are read worldwide, what do you expect from the legal professions and others everywhere? Incivility. You cannot expect the same so-called civility of old when the legal profession has changed in so many ways. No longer is the profession the preserve of the white male. Female judges, lawyers and professors are everywhere. Old-boy networks are on the run for their money. There are a sprinkling of minority judges and lawyers. To get to law school these days, one needs to do an LSAT exam and not just get a handshake from your friend's father or an two-minute interview. There are over 5,000 applicants for limited places in law schools, not the 10 or 20 applicants of the old days. Demeaning women and minorities at someone's pleasure and at their expense is now no longer tolerated. The backlash against political correctness has been uncivil. Challenge for cause on racial and other biases is now permitted. In provincial courts which do the bulk of the judging in Ontario, judges are no longer appointed through patronage, but by a committee after assessing an application from a lawyer. People are now more aware of their rights than at any other time in the history of Canada, and indeed every country. They do not any longer take insults and slights lying down. These changes contribute to so-called incivility. There are now more complaints against judges, police, lawyers, doctors, accountants, stockbrokers, politicians, teachers and others than at any other time in history - as it should be. With these shifting trends, surely, civility should be the least of our concerns, especially since it is concerned more about not pricking someone's pomposity than about the pursuit of justice, which I hypothesize so-called incivility is all about. Munyonzwe Hamalengwa is a Toronto lawyer specializing in criminal, constitutional and immigration law.
THE LAWYERS WEEKLY Criminalization is not the answer [back to top of page]
Munyonzwe Hamalengwa
Why is Canada increasingly becoming a criminalized society? Criminal law is increasingly seen and used as a saviour in the resolution of societal problems. But is criminal law ever a useful tool to correct society's woes? The Canadian government recently brought in legislation allowing law enforcement agencies to engage in criminal activities in the performance of their duties. In other words, the Canadian government has created and sanctioned organized criminals in the form of law enforcement agencies. This is one aspect of the increasing criminalization of societies. You officially create official organized criminals. There is no doubt that these official organized criminals will commit criminal acts independent of their official duties and then justify those illegal criminal acts as having been done in furtherance of investigating crime. They have always done this. Now they will have official sanction. The creation of official organized criminals is in answer to the perceived proliferation of unofficial organized criminals in the form of bikers. But there are already laws to deal with bikers and other organized criminals. The aim, however, in my view has been to create official organized criminals and allow Crown prosecutors an easy job to obtain convictions. The government has succumbed to intensified pressure from police forces, Crown attorney associations, law-and-order constituencies, the Canadian Alliance Party and the National Post. The increasing criminalization of Canada is thus politically driven. It is not a response to an actual increase in crime. The crime rate has been declining, as has been officially recognized for the past 10 - 20 years. All statistics prove this. Criminalization of societies is, however, global. Over the last several decades, national states have passed some domestic criminal legislation to fight organized crime and corruption. But only in the recent past have international organizations joined national states in creating international criminal statutes or laws to fight organized crime and corruption. However, there has not been any critical assessment or studies of what role, if any, the state in its domestic as well as international setting contributes to organized crime and corruption. Is organized crime and corruption the preserve only of non-state actors? It is my thesis that the state in its domestic and international setting is both the weakest as well as the strongest link in the fight against organized crime and corruption. As long as it is not recognized that organized crime and corruption are embedded in state structures, however asymmetrically, organized crime and corruption cannot be routed out. Canada has to recognize that by creating official organized criminals, the Canadian state becomes part of organized criminal conglomerates with significant negative impact on civil liberties and freedoms. To what extent does the state have an interest in the existence of organized crime and corruption? How implicated is the state in this phenomena? What does it do? What does it overlook? Who are the agents and what tools are deployed to fight these phenomena? Canada has also been increasingly criminalizing recent immigrants, particularly visible minorities. A 1994 study by Derrick Thomas conclusively showed that recent immigrants commit fewer crimes than the Canadian-born. Those who commit crimes are the least educated, are affected by high rates of unemployment, have low incomes, are from broken families, etc. There is a sociological explanation for their crimes. Canada is not interested in listening. Deportation is the ready answer, just as the criminalization of society is the ready answer to society's problems. Now we have to fight both the official and unofficial organized criminals. What a task this will be! Munyonzwe Hamalengwa is a Toronto lawyer specializing in criminal and immigration law. He can be reached by e-mail at mhamalengwa@sympatico.ca or by phone at (416) 222-8111. THE LAWYERS WEEKLY
The ground-breaking Supreme Court of Canada immigration decision handed down in July in the case of Mavis Baker has left unaddressed some of the most pressing issues of the day which, without their resolution, will act as a brake rather than a gigantic positive development in the use of law by disempowered immigrants. In Baker, the Supreme Court decided among others, that: (a) a decision-maker has to take into account the best interests of the children whose parent(s) face deportation consequences, (b) the standard of review of a humanitarian and compassionate decision is one of simple reasonableness, rather than the higher standard of patently unreasonable, and (c) international treaties Canada has ratified but not incorporated into domestic law are not binding on Canada but are of persuasive interpretative force. Baker is the most important Supreme Court Immigration decision since Singh, handed down in 1985. Singh decided that refugee claimants had a right to an oral hearing rather than being subjected merely to a paper process, since issues of credibility were involved. You cannot negatively decide someone's credibility without affording them an opportunity to be heard in person. Baker has brought to the fore some vexing questions, but without them being remarked upon by the Supreme Court justices and other commentators. The first is: why are some immigrants denied access to justice in Canada, given that in a lot of cases the central issue is what are the best interests of the Canadian-born children -to remain in Canada or to be removed from Canada along with their parents? How is it that Baker is the first immigration case to reach the Supreme Court dealing with the issue of best interests of children? There is also no right of appeal to a court of law when a negative decision in an immigration context is handed down. (There is a right of appeal in criminal cases, except to the Supreme Court of Canada.) In the immigration context, leave must be sought from the Federal Court of Canada, usually a hostile court where most judges worked in the federal Department of Justice or elsewhere in the federal government or were former members of Parliament or lawyers from Bay Street. Studies by Professor Ian Greene of York University and others show that a very small percentage of leave applications are granted. No reasons for a negative decision are given. The ground is stacked against immigrants in this process. If leave is granted but judicial review is denied, there is no right of appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal. In some cases the judge who denied your application for judicial review may be persuaded to certify a question for you to take to the Federal Court of Appeal. Certification is not a right; it involves begging a judge to allow you to proceed further. Certification of questions to the Federal Court of Appeal is rare. In that regard, Mavis Baker was lucky. Her lawyers found persuasive legal arguments. If the certified question or other issues argued in the Federal Court of Appeal are dismissed, there is no right of appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. One has to seek leave. This is further begging and the Supreme Court grants even fewer leave applications. With these hurdles, it becomes clear that Mavis Baker through her lawyers waged a tenacious struggle to the mountain top. By the same token, because of the denial of access to justice which this process engenders, you can imagine how many worthy cases were or are lost in the process. People have been turfed out of Canada or gone underground because they were denied access to justice as a result of this process. So the fundamental question in an immigration context is: How can access to justice be opened up? In the United States, access to justice has been recognized as a fundamental interest worthy of Constitutional protection: See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In Canada not only is this not recognized, a person has no right of appeal or even to a written decision. Access to justice ought to be recognized as a fundamental interest worthy of constitutional protection. Access to justice is further denied because of poverty or economic circumstances of the majority of immigrants affected by negative immigration decisions. While legal aid is generally accessible in criminal appeals, it is not available for immigration appeals. A lot of good cases go nowhere because immigrants cannot afford to hire lawyers. A lawyer cannot fight a case all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada without a retainer. The Department of Justice will fight any appeal process with all its might, using public resources. It is therefore not surprising that the Supreme Court of Canada, the most progressive court in the land, is rarely seized of otherwise good cases, because cases rarely if ever reach there. Immigrants may be better off if their issues were ventilated before the highest court in the land. This would be not only good for immigrants, but also for the development of the rule of law and enhancement of Canada's international reputation. The second vexing question of our time is: should Canada be bound by the provisions of the international treaties it has ratified but not yet incorporated into domestic law? The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that international treaties that Canada has ratified are only of persuasive but not binding value. This interpretation is a dumper. There is no justification to interpreting international treaties that way. There are two perspectives on this issue. One, called the dualist view, holds that a ratified treaty is not binding if it is not incorporated into domestic law. The other is the monist view, which holds that by ratifying a treaty, a country is bound by its provisions. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) compels member states to be bound by the treaties they have signed. If the Supreme Court adopted the monist view, Canada would perforce be bound by the international treaties it has signed. Why should a country be permitted to ratify international treaties and get a good name internationally as a result of it, and then expect not to be bound by the provisions of international treaties? There is a process acceptable in international law called "reservations"which Canada can engage in when it ratifies a treaty, rather than to nonchalantly ratify without any intention of being bound by its provisions. Imagine if Canada went before a North American Free Trade Agreement tribunal and stated that while it ratified the Agreement, it is not bound by its provisions. Or imagine you signed a contract with the federal government and performed your side of the bargain, but when you delivered the bill, the government told you that while it signed the contract with you, it was not bound to pay you. You would go to court and a judge would be irate at the government. Apparently not the Supreme Court of Canada. The highest court in the land is afraid of enforcing international contracts. What a shame. Munyonzwe Hamalengwa is a sole practitioner in Toronto. THE LAWYERS WEEKLY OPENING STATEMENT
Lawyers, like other professionals and non-professionals alike, occasionally encounter new experiences or unexpected happenings, or deal with unusual twists of life that need to be shared with other people. August brought a lot of unusual twists of experiences in my professional life, some of which I would like to share with you. They are limited to the legal sphere. The people who brought me these experiences would appropriately be categorized as having engaged in legal madness or legal incapacity. Judges I brought a bail review application in Superior Court of Justice for a young offender on August 6. That young offender was ably represented at his bail hearing by a duty counsel before a judge at the Etobicoke courthouse, but he was ordered detained. Pursuant to Section 8 of the Younger Offenders Act, a bail review lies in the Superior Court of Justice if a young offender is detained at first instance by a youth court judge. Applications for bail review are also provided for in Section 520 of the Criminal Code. The only court with jurisdiction for bail review, from orders emanating from provincial or youth court is the Superior Court. This has been so since I started practising law a decade ago and in fact since time immemorial, in terms of the existence of the Criminal Code which came into being in 1892. I brought the bail review before Superior Court Justice Peter Grossi. To my utter surprise, a crown attorney at 361 University Avenue told the judge that he had no jurisdiction to entertain my application, as only the provincial court had jurisdiction to entertain such applications. To my utter amazement and those of all who were present, the judge sided with the crown attorney. He dismissed my application and directed me to provincial court in Etobicoke. I filed an application in Etobicoke and appeared there on August 13. The crown attorney there, Paul Vesa, and his colleagues as well as Judge Lloyd Budzinski were shocked that a crown attorney at University Avenue and Justice Grossi could blatantly misread or misinterpret the law. Judge Budzinski obviously did not have jurisdiction. He encouraged me to seek costs against the Crown on my next trip to Superior Court. Given the gaffe by the Crown, they undertook to file the bail review application back in Superior Court rather than me. On August 18, I was back in Superior Court, where the Crown did not oppose the application and my client was released. I did not ask for costs because the Crown refiled my papers and did not oppose my client's release. If a judge can dismiss your application when the law is clearly on your side, can you imagine what happens when the law is not clear? Are judges blindly acceding to arguments by crown attorneys? Do judges perpetrate wrongful detentions and convictions? I have known judges to be pro-crown most of the time, but this experience was beyond the pail. In my respectful opinion, Justice Grossi and the crown attorney displayed legal incapacity and/or legal madness. A lawyer I was in Africa in June and July. A client whom I had bailed out numerous times for allegedly assaulting his wife, was re-detained in my absence. He retained a female lawyer just to do his bail hearing. He told her that on the primary case, he already had a lawyer - myself. The female lawyer told him without mincing any words that, for a charge of assaulting his wife, he needed a female lawyer to represent him. She advised my client that judges and juries look kindly on male clients who are tried for assaulting their wives if they are represented by a female lawyer. This was the first time I had heard of a female lawyer trying to attract business this way. Of course, this sales style has no truth whatsoever, even in custody cases where it is usually deployed. It does not comport with reality and the outcomes of cases. The most popular version is that deployed by desperate white lawyers who approach African Canadian accused and scare them into dumping their African Canadian lawyers because these accused will appear before a white judge, white jury, white witnesses, white police officers, all of whom will not look kindly on them because of the colour of their lawyers. A number of African Canadian accused buy into this mythology and promptly dump their African Canadian lawyers, whereupon their new white lawyers usually promptly plead them guilty and move on to another sales pitch while the accused is saddled with a criminal record. Not long after that, Immigration Canada will be knocking at the door. A few smart African Canadian accused reject the ploy outright. It is better to attract business the old-fashioned way -honestly, through referrals and through hard work. This lawyer and her ilk display legal incapacity and/or legal madness. Immigration and Refugee Board Over at the IRB, a board member by the name of Shirley Wales displayed legal incapacity and or legal madness. On June 3rd, I appeared at the IRB to represent a client by the name of Carrington. After hearing our prosecution of the appeal, the Minister's representative conceded that indeed, my client should be allowed a stay of the deportation order on terms and conditions. In all my practice at the IRB, any time the Minister's representative concedes that a stay is warranted, the board member, as a matter of course, allows the appeal and stays the deportation order. It goes the same at Immigration Detention Reviews. So on June 3, after the hearing, my client and I quietly started celebrating. Our spirits were somewhat dampened when the board member reserved judgement. Shortly after I returned from Africa, the decision came down. Although the Minister's representative had conceded, the appeal was dismissed. Now, if a Board member dismisses an appeal which had been conceded by the opposing side in an adversarial process like at the IRB, can you imagine how many dismissals this Board member issues in contested cases? This is legal incapacity and madness at its height. The Parole Board Over at Beaver Creek Institution in Gravenhurst, two parole board members engaged in legal incapacity and or legal madness on August 18 in a case called Kien Nguyen. Nguyen is my client whom I represented for full parole on that day. He had been denied a paper decision on his Accelerated Parole Review (APR) application. The Board had received communication from my client's former wife which alleged abuse on the part of my client. The Board has to direct full parole without conditions if it can be established that the person concerned will not commit a crime of violence before his Warrant Expiry Date. The only evidence of violence should be the criminal record of the person showing convictions for violence. There were no convictions for violent activity on the part of Nguyen. Even the former wife indicated that she does not fear any physical violence from Nguyen. In fact, she had never been assaulted by him. Nguyen had been living with his fiance for over two years. There was no contact with his former wife. Yet, because of a mere letter the board received from the former wife, the board concluded, without any documented evidence of prior violence, that Nguyen would be denied immediate full parole, and should instead stay in a halfway house because he is likely to commit a crime of violence before his Warrant Expiry Date. If Board members can play around with people's lives when there is no evidence, can you image how fair game you are if there is an iota of evidence? Nguyen is fuming. I am fuming. The above is merely the legal madness I encountered in August 1999. How about a decade of practising law? Munyonzwe Hamalengwa practises criminal and immigration law in Toronto. THE LAWYERS WEEKLY
The virulent attacks on some recent far-reaching decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada ensures Canada will enter the 21st century as legally and politically racist as it has always been. Not far behind are xenophobia and sexism. This is because the most vicious attacks on the Supreme Court of Canada have been directed at its decisions which give or recognize rights of native or aboriginal Canadians and/or other visible minorities, as well as sexual minorities (gays and lesbians) and women. I limit myself in this article to native rights. Attacks on Supreme Court decisions not involving the above-noted groups are muted. Let us produce the evidence by way of recent examples, going backwards. The Marshall decision is fresh. Donald Marshall is a native Canadian famous for spending 11 years for a murder he hadn't committed. His wrongful conviction was blamed on police and prosecutorial misconduct and racism by a Commission of Inquiry. Recently Marshall found himself charged for fishing out of season. His case went all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada which ruled in September that natives could fish for subsistence existence pursuant to a 1760 treaty. Hell broke loose on earth. The decision was attacked for supposedly "racial preference" of natives over non-natives. Leading the attacks on the decision and the Supreme Court were mainstream stalwarts Preston Manning and the Reform Party; the National Post; The Toronto Sun; all mainstream papers across Canada; and left- and right-wing intellectuals. The attacks were so relentless that the Supreme Court of Canada took an unprecedented step of clarifying its decision upon an application from non- native fishermen. The Supreme Court never before had clarified its decisions upon application, clarifications sometimes only coming in future cases. The opponents of the Supreme Court hailed the reclarified decision as a major victory, while natives regarded it as backtracking and a betrayal. The Supreme Court had previously and most recently refused to clarify the Finta decision on war crimes prosecutions. Parliament had clearly prohibited defences of "obeying official/superior orders" to commit war crimes. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed this defence, making it now impossible to prosecute war crimes in Canada. Another example of unprecedented attacks on the Supreme Court was elicited by its decision in Gladue handed down in early 1999. Gladue is a native Canadian who was convicted of a species of murder. She was given three years jail time pursuant to a subsection of s. 718 of the Criminal Code which requires judges to take into account the special circumstances of native offenders in sentencing. Despite the fact that most critics of the Supreme Court base their attacks on the court's alleged usurpation of political power from Parliament, in Gladue they abandoned this angle and accused the court of playing the race card. Yet the Supreme Court and the lower courts were applying a law, word for word, passed by Parliament. Prior to Gladue there was the famous Delgamuukw decision which recognized that treaty rights of aboriginals were valid in law and that oral evidence passed down the ages is as valid as the white man's written/documentary evidence. Delgamuukw excited perhaps the most unprecedented attacks on the Supreme Court since its establishment in 1875. One got the impression that Canada for once was finally defeated by native Canadians using the courts and particularly the Supreme Court. The Reform Party created a judicial watch to monitor the decisions of the Supreme Court and vowed to continue to attack it. Before Delgamuukw, the attacks on the Supreme Court were civil, measured and proportionate. Since Delgamuukw, the attacks have been uncivil and disproportionate and relentless. With the birth of the National Post, the dissidents have only grown in strength and numbers and forums of attacks. My thesis is that the vicious attacks on the Supreme Court is evidence of disguised and/or open discriminatory racism by mainstream Canadians and institutions. They are attacks on the only institution that is not held decidedly captive by them and the only institution that accede to the demands of native Canadians, albeit incrementally. These attacks are meant to shut down the only access to power and recognition for Native Canadians. These attacks are meant to maintain the discriminatory status quo prevailing in Canada since the nation's founding in 1867 and prior. This status quo is fast being disturbed by the Supreme Court as we enter the 21st century. The critics only mumble in disapproval when a decision involves non-natives. When it is natives, they groan. Soon-to-be Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin has been hailed by the Reform Party as a good choice (mainly because she comes from Alberta -the roots of the Reform Party) and because of her earlier dissent in Marshall. The critics now have their own at the helm. One of the greatest battles of the 21st Century in Canada will be: who will win the mind, heart and soul of the Supreme Court of Canada. The battle lines are drawn. Where do you stand? Munyonzwe Hamalengwa practices criminal and immigration law in Toronto. THE LAWYERS WEEKLY
The appointment of Justice Louis LeBel of the Quebec Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada by Prime Minister Jean Chretien on December 22nd, 1999 demonstrates yet again why the appointment process must adopt either the U.S. model of public hearings and confirmation process or the Ontario model of application and vetting by an independent body. Prime Minister Chretien has rolled the dice once again. The way The Globe and Mail reported the appointment is almost comical: "The news of Quebecker Louis LeBel's ascension to the Supreme Court of Canada yesterday caught everyone off guard (including the man himself). But since the shock subsided, the buzz in legal circles has been relentlessly positive". (Dec. 23, Page A16.) How could it come to pass that in a democracy like Canada's, an appointment to such a position of power is done secretly - an appointment of someone who is a nonentity, someone whose views on the law are unknown except the little research the reporters have gathered since the appointment? More comical, even when the appointed person is unknown, "the buzz in legal circles has been relentlessly positive." Therein lies the reason for the secretive appointment process. Everybody approves the candidate in any case. Why should there have been a public appointment process, when nobody says any bad thing about the appointed person? Throw your mind back to as far as you have been alive to the appointment process and ask yourself this question: Has there been any appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada that received any negative comments from the legal or political circles? None whatsoever. It is like the award of the Order of Canada. Everyone who is anybody in Canada eventually gets it. Every appointment to the Supreme Court is always warmly received. Everybody is happy. So what is the matter? The only opposition comes about because of the appointment process itself and not about the selected candidate himself or herself. And the voiced opinion comes from the media like The National Post and non-practising legal academics like Professor Jacob Zeigel of the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto and Professor Ian Hunter of the Faculty of Law of the University of Western Ontario. The National Post and the academics don't often appear before Judges. There is absolute silence from practising lawyers. If they vigorously opposed not only the appointment process but voiced serious opposition to the selected candidate himself or herself, this issue would have been long addressed. But practising lawyers are mum - even if they may have a low opinion of the candidate. If lawyers advocated for themselves, their profession, and rule of law as vigorously as they advocate for their clients -this would be a better place to live. There are many reasons why practising lawyers are silent about the appointment process. Firstly, lawyers are chickens when it comes to openly expressing their views about judges before whom they may or will appear. The rationale is that they will hurt their clients'cases if they oppose certain judges. But the real reason is lawyers'own chicanery. NOW Magazine once wrote an article trashing a few provincial judges and quoting some lawyers. All quoted lawyers asked for and got anonymity. Yet when lawyers are asked about anything else, they become boisterous. What a show. Judges are supposed to have thick skins. They were lawyers before elevation. They should be able to take frank opinions about themselves. Except that they all of a sudden start to suffer from the disease of judge-itis once appointed. Some literally imbibe the appellation of Lordship. They are Lords over us. And this with the consent and connivance or complicity of the practising bar. Very interesting legal and mental gymnastics are at play here. The second reason is that for most lawyers, it doesn't really matter how a judge gets there. Once the person is there, he or she is supposed to be independent and must be capable of listening and applying the law. Judges are supposed to acquire what I call "judicial capacity". Besides, judges simply choose which side must win from the arguments presented. Despite all the criticisms judges receive from the lay populace, about judicial activism, judges simply adopt the arguments of winning counsel. Nothing more and nothing less. Lawyers know this already. The issues were previously straitjacketed by the litigant and his or her lawyer. Judges are not innovators at all. The only way to prevent judicial activism is to abolish the Charter. Canada doesn't want to sink that low. Thirdly, regardless of the manner in which a judge ends up there, politics is involved. In the U.S., for example, the picking of a name for appointment is a political decision. The public has no input to who gets initially picked. At the end of the day, someone initially politically picked will be appointed. In the application process in Ontario, the committee narrows down the list of the applicants. Then the Attorney General and the Premier secretly choose from that list - the public has no input whatsoever. If the Committee is conservative, the candidates picked are likely to be conservative. The criticism of the appointment process may turn out to be much ado about nothing. The secretive appointment process is the ultimate in political patronage. That is really what the people are opposed to. However, this opposition must apply across the board. The Prime Minister and all Premiers appoint a raft of powerful individuals without a public hearing process. Only when this undemocrative process is wiped out across the board will we see a change in the appointment process to the Supreme Court of Canada. The beginning is to start opposing individual candidates appointed, if the opposition is justified and has merit. And not just for the sake of it. Munyonzwe Hamalengwa practices Criminal and Immigration Law in Toronto. THE LAWYERS WEEKLY
The statistic speaks for itself about the historic position of black judges and by extension, black lawyers in Canada. There have been only 19 black judges in the history of Canada. To understand the significance and magnitude of the place and role of black judges in Canada, consider this one fact: all 19 judges are still alive. This means that judicial appointment of blacks is of very recent vantage. The entry of blacks in the legal profession is very recent, it goes without saying. Now consider the other fact which shows the massive exclusion of blacks from legal advancement to judgeships, professorships and crown attorneyships. This is the fact that although the entry of white women in the legal profession is as recent as that of blacks, there have been four women judges at the Supreme Court of Canada, several are currently sitting at the Ontario Court of Appeal, law schools are populated to a degree of over 30 per cent white female professors, over 10 per cent of Ontario's Superior Court of Justice and the provincial court positions across the country are occupied by white females. Admittedly there are more white women in Canada than blacks, but this does not explain the absolute disparity in appointments between the two groups. There has been no black or other minority at the Supreme Court of Canada or the Ontario Court of Appeal. There are hardly any black judges in the Superior Court of Justice. There are hardly any black professors. There are only a few black prosecutors. There are hardly any black lawyers employed by Bay Street or Main Street lawyers. As you know, judges are usually recruited from professorial, prosecutorial and Bay or Main Street ranks. So if blacks are not appointed to be professors, prosecutors or recruited by Bay or Main Street firms, they do not show up on the radar screen of the appointment process. Unlike the active recruitment of white women (from all crevices and nooks), there is never any active recruitment of talented or qualified blacks. When black or minority women are recruited, they end up in provincial court even though their qualifications indicate Court of Appeal or Supreme Court of Canada calibre. Consider the case of Juanita Westmoreland-Traore. She was a law professor, Commissioner of the Ontario Employment Equity Commission and Dean of University of Windsor Law School. She was appointed to the provincial court. White women or law professors go straight to superior courts or courts of appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada. Mary Ellen Turpel Lafonde is a native woman, a graduate of Osgoode Hall Law School, Oxford University and Harvard University and lastly was a professor at Dalhousie University. She ended up in provincial court in Saskatchewan! You cannot attend Osgoode Hall Law School (UB), Oxford University (LLM) and Harvard Law School (LLD) and end up in provincial court anywhere else, except in Canada, if you are a minority. No white woman would have met a similar fate if she had these qualifications. Don't get me wrong; there is nothing wrong with being appointed to the lowest bench in the land, except that these appointments are skewed when they happen. I myself would be happy to be appointed to the provincial bench where justice is really served, but injustice also originates there. Denials of bail start there. I could make a great impact. (I could straighten out crown and defence lawyers.) I would write all my decisions heavily weighted in law. I would demand more pay. I could turn the rules of evidence upside down and let the higher courts deal with them. I would demand law reform. My quarrel with appointments to the provincial bench is that provincial judges do not make law. Supreme Court of Canada and Court of Appeal judges make law. Being unrepresented there, minorities do not participate in the reformation of law. Consider the following fact. The Law Society of Upper Canada keeps statistics about how many females are in the legal profession. The judiciary keeps statistics about how many females (read white) are judges. The law schools keep statistics about how many females are professors. The percentage of female crown attorneys is known. Yet the law societies, despite their equity programs, and the judiciary, the law schools and the government do not keep any statistics about the numbers of blacks (or other minorities) in the legal profession as judges, crown attorneys, professors or as working in Bay or Main Street firms. When I was merely a young law student in the 80s, I wrote then Justice Minister Doug Lewis, under the Mulroney government, about how many blacks or other minorities he had appointed to the judiciary. He said he did not have any statistics. When I submitted a proposal in 1991 to Peter Oliver of the Osgoode Society, which publishes books on Canadian Law in historical perspective, he refused my proposal because my subject matter (on blacks in Canadian law) dealt with judges and lawyers who were still alive, except Delos Davis and Sutherland. Osgoode Society only dealt with dead or inanimate subjects. My plea that an exception be made because of the exceptional nature of the subject, in that blacks are of recent vintage in the legal profession, he refused to make the exception. I have inundated Prime Minister Jean Chretien and Justice Minister Anne McLellan over the years to appoint a minority to the Supreme Court of Canada, to no avail. Mulroney, Lewis and Kim Campbell answered all my letters. Chretien and McLellan have never answered at all. Talk about the arrogance of power! Thus the only 19 alive black judges in Canadian history at the dawn of the 21st century are pioneers and trailblazers for blacks in the legal profession. The Canadian Association of Black Lawyers (CABL) honoured the 19 judges for their pioneering entry in the legal profession on February 26. Each of these judges has a rich and extensive history deserving a book. However that is not my intention here; I merely wish to mention their names and where they hail from. They are: Therese Alexander (B.C.), George Carter (retired - Ont.), Maurice Charles (retired - Ont.), Hugh Fraser (Ont.), Raymond Harris (Man.), Keith Hoilett (Ont.), Julius Isaac (Ont.), Lionel Jones (AB), Vibert Lampkin (Ont.), Eric Lindsay (Ont.), Marvin Morten (Ont.), Romain Pitt (Ont.), Micheline Rawlins (Ont.), Gregory Regis (Ont.), Selwyn Romilly (B. C.), Vibert Rosemay (Ont.), Corrine Sparks (N.S.), Juanita Westmoreland-Traore (Que.) and Castor Williams (N.S.). As can be seen, Ontario evidences openness to the appointment of blacks to the bench (12 appointments). British Columbia and Nova Scotia each have two, Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta one each. Other provinces are wastelands. All the judges except Julius Isaac (Federal Court), Keith Hoilett and Romain Pitt (Ontario Superior Court), and Selwyn Romily (B.C. Supreme Court) serve or served on the provincial courts of the respective provinces. Julius Isaac was Court of Appeal or Supreme Court of Canada material and so is Westmoreland- Troare because of their antecedents. Judge Charles served in the Supreme Court of Ghana before his appointment to the provincial bench in 1969 in Ontario. Would a person who served in the Supreme Court of England (if such existed) or of Australia or of Israel or of the U.S. or of France be appointed to the provincial bench? (I cannot comment on the calibre of other judges as I don't know their antecedents that well.) The challenges for black judges are enormous. Female judges have openly admitted and advocated that their presence on the bench will make a difference. As we await for the data to trickle in as to what difference women judges have wrought in, so do we await the difference black judges are to evidence. Munyonzwe Hamalengwa is a Toronto criminal lawyer.
R. v. Ritchie (Application for an Order of Restoration) [back to top of page]
R. v. Ritchie
IN THE MATTER OF an application pursuant to s.
15(1) of
Between
Ontario Court of Justice - Provincial Division
MacDONNELL PROV. DIV. J.:-- A. INTRODUCTION 1 This is an application by Allan Ritchie pursuant to s. 15(1) of the Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1, for an order restoring to him a conveyance, namely a Ford Aerostar van, which was seized by officers of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department on February 17, 1993. The application is resisted by counsel for the Attorney General of Canada, who seeks the detention of the vehicle pending the conclusion of the applicant's trial on charges of trafficking in cocaine contrary to s. 4 of the Act. Should the applicant be convicted, it is the intention of the Crown to apply under s. 16(2) of the Act for an order that the vehicle be forfeited to Her Majesty on the basis that it was used by the applicant in the commission of the alleged offences. 2 The application raises issues with respect to the appropriate procedure in a case where an application for restoration under s. 15 is brought prior to the conclusion of the trial proceedings which relate to the use of the seized conveyance. B. THE EVIDENCE ON THE APPLICATION 3 Both parties called viva voce evidence in the course of the hearing. The applicant testified that he is the registered owner of the vehicle in question. The Crown takes no serious issue with the applicant's testimony in that regard. The evidence adduced by the Crown related to the circumstances in which the vehicle was seized. Constable John Campbell of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department testified that on February 17, 1993, he was carrying out his duties in an undercover capacity in the vicinity of Oakwood Ave and Vaughn Road in Metropolitan Toronto. A male person walked up to him and a conversation ensued, as a result of which the male agreed to sell the officer $60 worth of crack cocaine. The two of them then travelled by taxi to Eglinton Avenue. After exiting the taxi, they met with the applicant outside of a fish market. The officer, the male, and the applicant had a drug related conversation, following which the three of them crossed the street and went to the applicant's Ford Aerostar van. The applicant's wife was seated in the front passenger seat. She removed a large quantity of crack cocaine from a bag which she carried in her lap and handed it to the applicant; the applicant took a "rock" of crack cocaine and handed it to the male. The applicant then returned the remainder of the cocaine to his wife. The other male broke off three smaller rocks and gave them to the officer in exchange for $60. The male gave some of that money to the applicant. 4 The second officer called by the Crown on this application was Constable Mark Ferrerio. He was detailed to search the applicant's van after his arrest. On the right rear seat he found a brown pouch which contained 16.42 grams of crack cocaine and about 33 grams of marijuana. A scale was also found inside the pouch. C. THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES 5 On behalf of the Crown, Mr. Cowan conceded that the applicant's motor vehicle will not be required as evidence in any pending trial proceedings. However, he submitted that the application for restoration should be refused on the basis of the rule of public policy, reflected in the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio, that a court should not restore to an individual the means by which that person has committed a crime. Mr. Cowan conceded that the onus was on the Crown to establish the requisite taint beyond a reasonable doubt. However, he further submitted that he was entitled to satisfy that onus without awaiting the result of the trial. He submitted that a conviction in those proceedings is not required before a s. 15(1) application can be refused on the basis of the rule of public policy. In the alternative, he submitted that if a conviction is required before restoration can be refused on a public policy basis, this application should be adjourned to await the verdict at trial. 6 On behalf of the applicant, Mr. Hamalengwa submitted that in the absence of a conviction for the underlying offence, the rule of public policy cannot be applied to defeat an application under s. 15(1). Thus, the only basis upon which the Crown is entitled to resist the application, he submits, is either that the vehicle is required as evidence or that the applicant is not the lawful owner of it nor otherwise entitled to its possession. Mr. Hamalengwa stressed that the applicant's ownership of the van was not in any realistic dispute, and that the Crown had conceded that it would not be required as evidence. Consequently, he submitted, on a plain reading of the provisions of s. 15(2) of the Narcotic Control Act, the applicant is entitled to an immediate order of restoration. 7 Mr. Hamalengwa further submitted that the application should not be adjourned to await the result of the applicant's trial because to do so would permit the Crown to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. 8 Two preliminary questions are raised by the submissions made by the parties: prior to a conviction for the underlying offence, is the Crown entitled to resist a s. 15(2) application on the basis of the rule of public policy on which the Crown relies; if not, should the application proceed to a determination on the merits before the conclusion of the trial of the underlying offence. D. THE STATUTORY SCHEME 9 Sections 10 to 19 of the Narcotic Control Act set out a scheme dealing with search, seizure and forfeiture in the context of investigations and proceedings in relation to offences under the Act. The particular sections which are pertinent to the issues raised by the case at bar are, in part, the following:
E. ANALYSIS 10 This application is brought pursuant to s. 15(1) of the Act, which provides for restoration of goods seized pursuant to s. 11. The Crown has taken no objection to the manner in which the application is framed, and the applicant has raised no issue with respect to the legality of the seizure. It is implicit in the positions taken by the parties that in seizing the applicant's van the police acted under the authority of s. 10 and s. 11 of the Act. The search was conducted without a warrant. In R. v. Grant (unreported, released September 30, 1993), the Supreme Court of Canada held that a warrantless search of a place other than a dwelling house is constitutionally permissible under s. 10 only where exigent circumstances render it impracticable to obtain prior judicial authorization. However, in the absence of an issue raised by the parties with respect to the legality of the seizure in the circumstances of this case, it is unnecessary to further consider whether the police have legally obtained possession of the van. 11 Under s. 11, the power to seize is not limited to things which the officer believes may be evidence. The section authorizes a peace officer acting under s. 10 to seize, inter alia, anything by means of which that officer reasonably believes a narcotics of fence has been committed or that may be evidence of the commission of such an offence. To put it another way, section 11 authorizes the seizure of anything that is reasonably believed to have been used to commit a narcotics of fence whether or not the seizing officer also believes that the thing may be evidence. Conveyances provide the most obvious example of things which might be used to commit drug offences but which might not be believed to be evidence of the commission of such offences. It would be a rare case in which it was sought to enter a conveyance into evidence. Yet, s. 16(2), by specifically referring to the disposition after a trial of "any conveyance seized under s. 11", makes clear that conveyances are within the class of things which may be seized provided that the requisite belief is formed. 12 Where a conveyance has been seized pursuant to s. 11, the Act contemplates two applications which might be brought for a judicial determination of who should have possession of it. Section 16(2) provides that following a conviction for an offence under s. 4 or s. 5, the Crown may apply to the trial judge for an order declaring that a conveyance that has been shown to have been used in connection with the offence be forfeited to Her Majesty. There is an obvious connection between the authority to seize a conveyance under s. 11 and the power to order it forfeited under s. 16(2): the former is aimed, at least in part, at preserving the conveyance in an exigible state pending a judicial decision under s. 16(2). 13 The second application which the Act contemplates with respect to a thing seized pursuant to s. 11 is an application under s. 15. Pursuant to that section, any person may apply to a provincial judge within two months of the seizure for an order restoring to the applicant what was seized. To obtain such an order, the applicant must establish two things: that he or she is "entitled to possession", and that the thing seized will not be required as evidence in any proceedings in respect of an offence under the Act. If the applicant establishes those prerequisites, then "subject to s. 16" the judge shall order the thing seized to be restored. 14 An application under s. 16(2) can only be brought following conviction, and must be brought before the trial court, which will very often be the superior court of criminal jurisdiction. An application under s. 15 must be brought within two months of the seizure, and must be made to a provincial judge. Under ordinary circumstances, a s. 15 application will come before the provincial judge long before a verdict is rendered in the trial of the underlying offences. In some cases, the different time frames contemplated by the Act for applications under s. 15 and s. 16(2) will not pose any difficulty. However, in other cases, of which the case at bar is one, a procedural issue arises. The issue arises in part because of the lack of symmetry between the statutory criteria for forfeiture in s. 16(2) and the criteria for restoration in s. 15(2). Under s. 16(2), a conveyance lawfully seized pursuant to s. 11 but not required as evidence may be ordered forfeited if it is shown that it was used in the commission of the underlying offence. That is, it may be forfeited if the Crown shows that it is tainted by its connection to the offence. However, under s. 15, the same conveyance, if not required as evidence, is to be restored to the applicant if it is established merely that the applicant is "entitled to possession". Section 15 does not, on its face, appear to contemplate consideration of whether the conveyance is tainted. 15 In many of the cases which have dealt with s. 15(2), the courts have resolved this apparent anomaly by reading the words "entitled to possession" in s. 15(2) to mean "lawfully entitled to possession", and by applying the rule of public policy that the courts will not enforce a claim arising out of illegal conduct ("ex turpi causa non oritur actio"). It is unnecessary in these reasons to review the authorities which have taken that approach, nor those which have rejected it. All the relevant cases were considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Fleming v. The Queen (1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d) 297. As both the applicant and the respondent rely on Fleming to support their positions, the facts of that case and the reasons of the Supreme Court of Canada should be reviewed. 16 In Fleming, one Ernest Gombosh was charged with narcotics offences. He had been searched on two occasions in October, 1979, and drugs, drug paraphernalia and cash had been seized. On December 17, 1979, he applied under what was then ss. 10(5) and (6) of the Act [now s. 15 (1)(2) and (3)] for restoration of the cash. The hearing was adjourned. On February 28, 1980, prior to trial, Gombosh died. Letters of administration were granted to Fleming, who pursued the restoration application in his capacity as administrator of Gombosh's estate. Because of the death of Gombosh, there was no possible evidentiary use for the money which had been seized. The issue which remained, however, was whether the applicant was "entitled to possession" of the money. In relation to that issue, the relevance of the allegation that the money was the product of drug trafficking -- and thus tainted -- fell for consideration. 17 The provincial judge who presided at the restoration hearing ordered the money paid to the administrator. Smith J. quashed that order on the basis that the provincial judge had failed to take into account the rule of public policy that the courts will not make orders permitting litigants to benefit from their crimes. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of Smith J. The administrator appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which unanimously held that the restoration order made by the provincial judge should be reinstated. 18 The reasons of the court were delivered by Wilson J. In her view, three questions were raised: what is meant by s. 10(6)(a) [now s. 15(2)] entitlement; on whom lies the burden; and what is the standard of proof? In response, she stated at p.319:
19 While Wilson J. made clear that to establish entitlement to possession an applicant had only the minimal burden of showing that he or she was in possession at the time of seizure, she also made clear that the issue of taint was relevant to whether restoration should be granted. However, she placed the burden on the Crown to establish the requisite taint beyond a reasonable doubt. At pp. 319-20, she stated:
[emphasis added] 20 In the second of those two paragraphs, Wilson J. was expressly addressing the question of proof of taint on an application under what is now s. 16(2) of the Act, which by its terms requires a conviction as a condition precedent to an order of forfeiture. In that context, there is nothing remarkable about the procedure described. However, Wilson J. went on to import the requirement of a prior conviction into attempts by the Crown to establish taint on applications for restoration under what is now s. 15(1). At p. 321 she stated:
[emphasis added) 21 There is nothing ambiguous about that statement, which on its face appears intended to be of general application. In my view, it settles the first of the two preliminary questions raised by this application. Therefore, before the Crown can resist a restoration application on the basis of taint, there must be a conviction for the underlying offence which is said to give rise to the taint. As a verdict in relation to the underlying offence lies somewhere in the future, the Crown is not at this time in a position to establish the basis for the application of the public policy rule which would deny the applicant an order of restoration. 22 The second question is whether the application before the court should proceed to a determination on the merits while the trial proceedings are pending. In my opinion, it does not necessarily follow from what was said in Fleming that the applicant is entitled to an immediate order of restoration. In Fleming, the situation which existed at the time the restoration order was made was significantly different from that in the case at bar. There was no issue with respect to the order in which applications under s. 15(1) and s. 16(2) should proceed. At the time the restoration order was made, there were no other proceedings relevant to the seized moneys pending. The proceedings in relation to the underlying offence had been terminated by the death of Gombosh. Quite clearly, the Crown was never going to be in a position to prove a conviction and therefore the Crown was never going to be able to satisfy the criteria for the application of the rule of public policy. 23 There is nothing in Fleming which suggests that if a restoration application is brought prior to the trial for the underlying offence, it should in all cases proceed to a determination on the merits at that time. Indeed, in my view, Wilson J.'s judgment suggests the contrary. The reasons in Fleming do not cast doubt on the appropriateness of seizing conveyances or other items used to commit narcotics offences, nor do they deny the relevance of taint to the determination of restoration applications. They clarify what issues are material on a s. 15 application and the nature and incidence of the burden of proof in relation to those issues. It would not be reasonable to suppose that while the Supreme Court affirmed the right of the Crown to resist a restoration application on the basis of the rule of public policy, it at the same time contemplated refusing the Crown a reasonable opportunity to establish the criteria for the application of that rule. In cases such as the case at bar, where the thing said to have been used in the commission of the offence is not required as evidence, to require the restoration application to proceed while trial proceedings are incomplete would be to permit the public policy rule to be routinely defeated. That result would thwart the scheme set up by Parliament to deal with seizure, forfeiture and restoration in narcotics matters. As was noted above, the power to seize a thing by means of which a narcotics offence was committed and the authority to order it forfeited to the Crown are related components in a scheme. Parliament intended to provide a process by which such things, whether or not they are required as evidence, could be removed from those who use them in the commission of drug offences and held pending a forfeiture hearing pursuant to s. 16. To allow a s. 15 application to proceed in relation to a conveyance which has been seized because it is believed that it is being used to commit narcotics offences would defeat the scheme. While the police would be authorized to seize such a conveyance, they would be obliged to return it if the person from whom it was taken applied to a provincial court judge and proved that it was in his or her possession at the time of seizure. Such an approach would effectively sterilize a significant aspect of a scheme set up to assist in the enforcement of the narcotics laws. 24 It has on occasion been suggested that restoration prior to trial in cases such as the case at bar would not defeat Parliament's intention, that there would be nothing to stop the trial judge, following conviction, from ordering a vehicle in the possession of the accused forfeited: Re Hicks and the Queen (1977), 36 C.C.C. (2d) 91, (Man.C.A.), per Hall J.A., at p. 96. Assuming that suggestion to be consistent with the language used in s. 16, it asks too much of human nature to expect that persons whose conveyances are in jeopardy of forfeiture under 16(2), and who, because of the requirement of a conviction, will normally be page persons who are in fact guilty of serious criminal offences, will not take steps toward ensuring that the conveyance is unavailable by the time the s. 16(2) application is brought. 25 There may well be cases in which it would be appropriate to proceed with the s. 15 application without waiting for the result of the trial proceedings. It is a matter of discretion for the provincial judge before whom the application is returnable. In my view, considerations such as have been described in these reasons are relevant to the exercise of that discretion. F. DISPOSITION 26 For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that it is not appropriate to determine this application on the merits at the present time. Accordingly, I adjourn it pending completion of the trial proceedings in relation to the underlying offences. QL Update: 20001017 The Lawyers Weekly
The recent appointment of yet another white jurist to the Supreme Court of Canada is another missed great opportunity to diversify that august institution in terms of racial and cultural composition. It is also disappointing that media, academic and judicial commentators have evidently avoided this unpleasant topic. In February 1990, Justice Bertha Wilson raised the question in a paper at Osgoode Hall Law School when she asked, "Will Women Judges Make a Difference?" Why is it not imperative to ask a similar question in relation to racial and cultural minorities?: "Will Minority Judges Make a Difference?" It cannot be disputed that justice to a large extent depends on those who preside over it. Have you ever wondered that the Supreme Court of Canada has never in the recent past pronounced any judgment recognizing that race could make a difference in the outcome of a case? Imagine now if there were minority judges on the court. Wouldn't they make a difference, just like the presence of women led to the recognition of the "battered woman syndrome" as a defence to murder? Justice largely depends on experience and perception. In politics, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien hesitated to appoint a racial minority to his cabinet, particularly an African-Canadian. Chrétien has now bitten the bullet. Just as Canada had appointed the first African-Canadian female to a cabinet post, I would urge that it is also time to appoint a first racial minority to the Supreme Court of Canada. Justice L'Heureux-Dubé's retirement should have led Chrétien to appoint a visible or cultural minority, for example, Juanita Westmoreland, a black judge, or Vern Krishna, of Indian ancestry, who is currently the treasurer of the Law Society of Upper Canada, or Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafonde, a native scholar and judge, or others out there. A replacement need not necessarily have come from Quebec. The tradition has been broken before in the appointments of chief justices. When the Quebec provincial quota was set, Canada was supposedly a bilingual and bicultural country (even if it excluded the natives), now Canada is arguably a multiracial and a multicultural country. The excuse that Westmoreland could not be appointed because she is in the Quebec Provincial Court and not the Quebec Court of Appeal should not be countenanced. Westmoreland had already occupied positions that qualify her for Supreme Court appointment - she was the chief commissioner at the now disbanded Ontario Employment Equity Commission and later served as dean of law at the University of Windsor. Lawyers have been appointed straight from legal practice to the Supreme Court. Westmoreland has done this and more. Every treasurer of the Law Society of Upper Canada has been elevated to a position of prominence - most notably to the Ontario Court of Appeal or as minister of justice (Alan Rock). The current treasurer, Vern Krishna, is perhaps the most academically accomplished of all the former treasurers and the most published. In addition, he is both a professor of law teaching tax law and a prominent tax lawyer. He is eminently qualified to any position that may arise in the Supreme Court of Canada along with Westmoreland, and Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafonde. Justice Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafonde is a graduate of Osgoode, Harvard and Oxford universities. She taught law at Dalhousie Law School. She served on many native commissions and affairs. She is extensively published. She is currently a provincial judge in Manitoba. Any of these could have been appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada. It cannot be said that there are no qualified racial and cultural minorities out there. Munyonzwe Hamalengwa Toronto The Lawyers Weekly
Special international court, not [back to top of page] Osama bin Laden, now the most hated man in recent history, is accused of committing the greatest terrorist crime in all of history. However, if he were criminally tried, he might end up ridiculing, if not beating, both the American legal and criminal justice systems as well as the process of international criminal justice. A bin Laden trial would show that the much-vaunted concepts in the American and international justice systems, of innocence until proven guilty, conviction requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to due processes of the law, the right to confront and cross-examine your accusers and other concepts, do not apply when someone is accused of committing the most horrendous crimes in history. Osama bin Laden would be putting the U.S. in the position of the victim being the accuser, prosecutor, judge and jury - something which, at least in principle, is strange to the American judicial process. Justice in America would be put on trial and tested to its limits. If, on the other hand, bin Laden would be tried in some international criminal court, there would also be cause for suspicion. The Americans have opposed the creation of an independent international tribunal for all countries and they have not signed the Rome Statute of 1998 creating the International Criminal Court. It would be suspicious if they agreed that such an independent court should try their most vile criminal suspect. They would be seen to be forcing a conviction directly or indirectly despite the fact international criminal tribunals are supposed to be neutral. Thus bin Laden's case would end up exposing the charade of both the American justice system and whatever exists of the international criminal justice system. This may cause, perhaps not this generation but the next, to be suspicious of any trials of international criminals before the American and the international criminal tribunals. It would not matter if bin Laden would be acquitted or convicted; conviction is a foregone conclusion but the process would be exposed as unfair. If he were to be acquitted, there would be such a shock, that whatever criminal justice system produces such a result would be lying in tatters because of its own decision. Even before the result there would be questions such as: Would he get full disclosure? (Remember McVeigh?) Would he be able to confront his accusers? Would he be allowed to call witnesses? This trial would be explosive! The American and the international criminal justice systems are not currently equipped to try the likes of Osama bin Laden in a fair and equitable manner. One way to accomplish a future fair trial would be to publicize the concrete evidence before any trials take place and not have to spring up surprise evidence or witnesses later. These would be suspected of having been created or pressured to testify against bin Laden for some advantage. Such a development would taint the trial and deny its legitimacy. The worst criminals deserve the best due processes of the law. That is when justice shines brightest. The Americans are probably praying that bin Laden will not be captured alive, and he most likely won't. If he is captured, he must be tried by a specially created international criminal tribunal or held in perpetual detention by such a tribunal after having been accorded all due processes of the law. The Americans should never be allowed to try him. This crime is too serious to be left to the Americans alone. Munyonzwe Hamalengwa Toronto The Lawyers Weekly Canada's legal profession 'lazy by comparison' [back to top of page] Are Canadian judges, law professors, law students, prosecutors and lawyers lazy in comparison to their U.S. counterparts? If you look at the intellectual, academic and other output by the judicial and legal profession in the U.S. you will no doubt come to the conclusion that the legal profession in Canada is lazy by comparison. The profession in Canada is quite narrow-minded and most of what it puts out in terms of publications is legally focused, doctrinaire and largely uncritical. There is no intellectual combativeness or freshness that is prevalent in the U.S. Canada is also quite intellectually repressive and suppressive of dissenting, fresh, combative and divergent perspectives, in comparison. According to Conrad Black, Canada celebrates mediocrity. If the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms had not come into existence in 1982, Canada would be a sterile legal environment. Most of the law and political science professors all of a sudden, found something to write and disagree about. Journalists found something to trash. Left- and right-wing ideologues found a ready-made ball to kick around; but mostly in an uncreative fashion. The Charter has, however, also contributed to the intellectual laziness of the legal profession. In almost all the publications put out by judges, lawyers, prosecutors, professors and students, the arguments are limited to legal commentary focused on the Charter. There is hardly any critical analysis prevalent in the U.S.; broader intellectual analysis is skewed. Some critical analysis in Canada has come mostly from conservative political science professors, for example, F. L. Morton and Rainer Knopf of Calgary and others. The law professoriate has been uncritical except professors like Michael Mandel of Osgoode Hall Law School in his book, The Legalization of Politics in Canada, Joel Bakan of U.B.C. and a few others. Publications by judges and lawyers have been limited to summarizing the law - a very unexciting venture in itself. Alternatively, judges and lawyers have been silent on issues that they should be critical and vocal about. Law book and law magazine publishers have been focused on the bottom-line dollar profits. Judges and lawyers in Canada have been outdone by journalists and political science professors, something that should not happen. They should have written extensively about the wrongful conviction of Guy Paul Morin, David Milgaard and others, but they have not. They should have written about the Paul Bernardo case, but did not. When judges are attacked in Canada, we are told it is unfair because judges cannot defend themselves. Yet judges have more platforms than just about anybody else. They can reply through books, judgments, newspaper columns, speeches at universities or elsewhere or through proxies. Any judge can say anything and the media will print it. They just have to ask. I call for a tax charge on intellectual laziness. Munyonzwe Hamalengwa North York, Ont. THE LAWYERS WEEKLY Police, Prosecutors 'intricately intertwined' [back to top of page] Is governmental misconduct an aberration? The best definition is that found in Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edition being the latest). As the police and prosecutors are agents of the state and in fact act in the name of the state, they have every aspect of governmental (state) misconduct. They are intricately intertwined. There are, however, occasions when judges or commissions of inquiry attribute misconduct directly to government. There are also times when allegations of misconduct are attributed directly to the government. An example of allegations of governmental misconduct is the case of the Ipperwash shooting that resulted in the death of Dudley George, a Native Canadian, in 1995. The allegation is that the confrontation between the police and the native band and the resulting shooting was fomented directly from the Premier's Office. It is also alleged that the misconduct deals with the attempt to cover up by the government exactly what transpired before and after the shooting. Were documents destroyed? What was the chain of command? An investigation and an official commission of inquiry is being called for by various constituencies. Another allegation of governmental misconduct involves police tear-gassing or pepper-spraying of demonstrators at the APEC Summit in Vancouver. What was the role of the Prime Minister in that affair? Was there a governmental coverup? Another allegation of governmental misconduct involves the Somali affair. What was the role of the government in the destruction of documents or evidence? When did the Government of Canada know about the wrongdoing of its soldiers in Somalia? What did the government do after learning of the tragedy in Somalia? Coverup? Gordon Gibson reports in The Globe and Mail of August 31 a judicial finding of governmental misconduct in the case of Carrier Lumber Ltd. v. Her Majesty the Queen. This case deals with Native Land claims. Gibson, quoting from the case, reports of judicial finding of governmental obstruction of justice. The Crown was guilty of "a massive failure" to disclose documents, many of which still remain missing. A governmental official found truth and accuracy an unfortunate handicap", which led another official to create a new record "calculated to deceive". Gibson concludes by stating that, "the abuse of power detailed in the judge's ruling exemplifies a political culture that puts the executive branch above the rule of law and sneers at the due process". And it is endemic and not an aberration. Every wrongful conviction that was followed by a commission of inquiry has concluded that governmental misconduct is systemic and it is always at the expense of innocent victims. That government, that police officer, that crown attorney and that judge who postures to be the embodiment of moral values on earth is in fact a perpetrator of systemic misconduct against the innocents and guilty alike. The sooner we all admit to our human frailties rather than posture as possessed of the wisdom of King Solomon or the innocence of Jesus Christ, the better for humankind. Munyonzwe Hamalengwa Toronto THE LAWYERS WEEKLY
LETTER TO THE EDITOR No prison justice without legal aid [back to top of page]
Will the massive denial and unavailability of legal aid to most prisoners, particularly those under the immigration quagmire, further erode prison justice and the rights of prisoners? It has come to my attention through the representation of several clients that some inmates facing immigration issues are being denied their rights without due process of the law. I have directed some of these clients to apply for legal aid. All have been denied legal aid certificates without any good reasons whatsoever. It appears that legal aid is only available to individuals who have been charged and are facing a possibility of a jail term. I think legal aid panels assume that those who are convicted and sentenced no longer face any perils or erosion of their rights in jail! Legal aid also occasionally comes to the aid of people appealing convictions and/or sentences. However, it denies almost everyone seeking other prerogative remedies. There should be no distinction whatsoever. The treatment of these individuals is contrary to s.15 of the Charter, which provides for equal application and benefit of the law without discrimination. A number of my clients are removed from the general population and sent into segregated detention without reason. The excuse is that these individuals are under Immigration investigation. (Immigration invariably denies this allegation.) My clients then continue to be held in segregated detentions. While in segregated detention, they miss out on the programs they were doing, they are denied physical exercise, they miss out on their parole hearings, they cannot pursue bail pending appeal and so on. They are generally treated as dangerous when they are not. Then legal aid is refused. The majority of these individuals are minorities. What the Archambault Report stated in 1933 about prison justice, a point reiterated by the Swackhammer Report of 1971, now still applies, and largely to people under the Immigration arm - the most despised, marginalized and deserted of the prison population. And this is that "The prisoner [Immigration] feels that he has no access to a fair administration of justice and is absolutely removed from the protection of his fellow man." These individuals find further that Legal Aid is not interested in coming to their aid. This has to change. You also find that a massive injustice is committed and without a remedy because these individuals have no legal resources to correct it, when they are held in indefinite detention just because of their immigration status. And they are held in prisons where they don't belong. They are subjected to cruel and unusual punishment contrary to s. 12 of the Charter and international law. This note is a plea for prison justice for people facing immigration problems. They are poor. They need legal aid certificates. That is the only way they can get to the well of prison justice, if there is any. Munyonzwe Hamalengwa North York, ON THE LAWYERS WEEKLY
New chief accused of 'crime-mongering' [back to top of page]
Why is the new Police Chief of Toronto, Julian Fantino, crime-mongering when all the statistics in Toronto, Canada and the whole of North America show a significant drop in crime rate over the past decade and more? When a person in authority engages in crime-mongering, although there is evidence to the contrary, this raises unjustified physical and psychological fear in the community, particularly among vulnerable individuals like the elderly, women, the young and business people. When a person experiences physical and psychological fear and apprehension, this triggers periodic emotions of panic and paralysis. Their health is affected. They lose appetite for life and it is totally unnecessary. All this is caused by people in authority warning about the rising crime wave when there is none. They capitalize on single brutal criminal activities that are not representative of a trend. They prey on moral panics caused by these overblown incidents, which are few and far apart, to concoct figures of a rising crime wave, especially by the youth. Who would you trust? Statistics Canada says crime has gone down 20.7% since 1991. The Centre of Criminology at the University of Toronto states that there has not been any increase in serious criminal activity (murder, armed robbery, sexual assault, etc.) over the past 10 to 15 years. This encompasses both youth and adult involvement. Toronto police figures also show that serious criminal activity has gone down. For example, homicides have gone down by 13.1%. So have those involving sexual assault and burglaries. The Federal Bureau of Investigation also shows figures on the decline of crime across the U.S.A. in all categories over the last several years. Munyonzwe Hamalengwa Toronto THE LAWYERS WEEKLY
LETTER TO THE EDITOR Says authors of wrongful convictions should be held personally accountable [back to top of page] Why is the U.S., which prides itself of having the best legal and political system in the world, responsible for a disproportionate number of wrongful convictions in the world? And these are not your ordinary cases; these wrongful convictions are perpetrated against people facing the death penalty because of the nature of the offences! And why is Canada, also purportedly running the best legal and political system in the world, increasingly registering wrongful convictions? The latest victim in Canada of a wrongful conviction is Kulaveeringsam Karthiresu, who was finally freed on March 27 after spending close to seven years in jail for a murder he did not commit. Again, these are not ordinary wrongful convictions; they involve convictions for murder for which the minimum sentence without parole is 25 years in prison. Think of wrongful convictions that are never discovered. Think of the wrongful convictions in the run-of-the-mill cases like assault, resisting arrest, etc. The Governor of Illinois suspended the implementation of the death penalty in Illinois in January until a full investigation has taken place to find out the causes of the phenomenon of wrongful convictions. This became necessary after it was discovered that 13 people on death row had been wrongfully convicted, and had it not been for DNA tests and or other evidence, they would have been put to death. A lot of people think they can never find themselves in a situation where they will be wrongfully charged and wrongfully convicted. As Guy Paul Morin said, "It could happen to you." However, everybody who cares to know very well knows the causes of wrongful convictions. Barry Scheck and his friends in their recent book Actual Innocence (2000) and the Guy Paul Morin Inquiry into his wrongful conviction (1998) have catalogued some of the causes: police tunnel vision; police misconduct; prosecutorial misconduct; judicial bias; false eye witness identification; media induced public hysteria; racism; and so on. While the causes of wrongful convictions are well known, the solutions proffered have been lame or elusive. The DNA data bank is commendable. This will help correct some miscarriages of justice. But how do you prevent deliberate police, prosecutorial and judicial misconduct or racism? My thesis, however, is that as long as the perpetrators of wrongful convictions are not personally accountable, wrongful convictions will continue to occur. As long as prosecutors, police and judges know that they will not personally be hit with costs or prosecutions for purposely perpetrating a wrongful conviction, why would they not do it again? There is no downside to it. A judicial apology, while commendable, falls short of redress. Innocent taxpayers pay for compensations. Nobody paid for the wrongful conviction of Guy Paul Morin and they are known. I propose that perpetrating a wrongful conviction be made a criminal offence punishable in substantial costs or stigmatizing prosecution attracting a sentence of five years or more upon conviction. In a breath, you will see wrongful convictions vanish. Judges, prosecutors and police revere the word "deterrence"; it is high time it is applied to them as it applies to you and me. Munyonzwe Hamalengwa Toronto THE LAWYERS WEEKLY
Dube really a 'progressive-conservative' [back to top of page]
Supreme Court Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dube has been hailed as "the great dissenter" in Canada. She relishes that role as well. Over the last few years, she has indeed become very outspoken. She has given numerous speeches which inevitably have provoked some intemperate responses here and there. Then she has let her decisions in the Supreme Court of Canada speak for themselves. These in turn have further triggered some critical commentaries. She is to be commended for providing sparks on the otherwise staid legal terrain in Canada. When you examine Justice L'Heureux-Dube's dissents, they have largely been in the area of rights affecting women. Her decisions are awash with creations from feminist writings and she scores very good points using the feminist framework. However, when it comes to criminal law, she has no sympathy for the rights of criminals and her decisions are the most conservative of any judge in the last 30 years. With respect to feminist issues, Justice L'Heureux-Dube is very progressive but with respect to criminal law, she is very conservative, thus earning this eminent Justice the hallowed title of progressive-conservative. Munyonzwe Hamalengwa Toronto For the Defence Criminal Lawyers' Association
Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 30 March/April 2001 Lawyers and Contempt of Court: Nelson Mandela [back to top of page]
by Munyonzwe Hamalengwa 1 Lawyers who have been threatened with a contempt of court citation are in good company. This note refers to one such lawyer and how he fought the endemic disease of Judgeitis. 2 Before he became the feared black pimpernel, the world's most famous political prisoner and an acclaimed international statesman, Nelson Mandela, was an ordinary lawyer doing his thing in apartheid South Africa in the 1950s, subject to racial humiliation on a constant basis. Mandela doesn't talk much about this humiliation in his international best seller, The Long Walk to Freedom. He is such a modest person. 3 Mandela took the humiliation in stride, using the courtroom as a theater of struggle just like it was a theater of political struggle outside the courtroom. Martin Meredith recounts some of the humiliations Mandela suffered and the counterattacks Mandela engaged in, in his book, Nelson Mandela, A Biography, (New York; St. Martins, 1997). 4 One time Mandela appeared before magistrate Willem Dormehl. This is the exchange that took place: MANDELA: I appear for the accused, Your Worship. MAGISTRATE: And who are you?
Ask yourself how you would react if you were in Mandela's shoes? On the next sitting, Mandela presented his certificate and the case proceeded. But magistrate Dormehl wasn't finished with Mandela:
After some fifteen minutes of interruptions, Mandela's patience was wearing thin.
Mandela remained standing while Dormehl counted slowly to three. The magistrate then ordered Mandela to be removed from court. The court orderly, a young constable, moved in his direction. "You had better not touch me if you don't want any trouble." Mandela warned. The constable hesitated. Mandela picked up his files and walked out of court with the words "I'll be back." ¶ 5 After consulting other attorneys, Mandela came back in a big way. That magistrate was removed and the court of appeal chastised him. "This is the sort of thing that brings the administration of justice in disrepute in our country... Tell your client that the quicker he recuses himself, the better for all concerned". The Court of Appeal told the Magistrate's lawyer. ¶ 6 Another time, a white judge decided to embarrass Mandela in a big way. Mandela had just won his first case and was feeling very good when the Judge looked up and told him, "Mr. Mandela, I have found your client not guilty, not because of you, but in spite of you." Put yourself in Mandela's place at the time. Mandela took everything in stride. Would you? ¶ 7 Close to forty years later, Mandela had power of appointment of magistrates and all judges of South Africa. What a transformation! What an ultimate "revenge". The prosecutor who sent him to jail for life in 1964 and all the judges who humiliated him in the 1950s and 1960s were still alive when Mandela became President. He invited the prosecutor to dinner. What an extraordinary man, Mandela is. QL Update: 20050505
Letters to the Editor
The Director Dear Sir/Madam: I wish to alert your attention to the rapidly developing legislation in the legislature of the province of Ontario, Canada, whose outcome will be none other than the interference with the independence of the judiciary in the criminal justice system in Ontario. The legislative activities have moved from mere threats to the independence of the judiciary, to the stage of "clear and present" if not actual danger to the independence of the judiciary. A bill entitled Judicial Accountability Act has already passed second reading in the legislature and has been sent to committee for further assessment and redrafting. This Bill that was introduced as a private member's bill has the support of the Premier of the Province, the Honourable Mike Harris and the Attorney General of the Province, the Honourable Jim Flaherty. Normally, a private members Bill is not supposed to go this far in the legislative process but this Bill which was introduced in the atmosphere of much judicial bashing throughout the country, because of the perceived enhancement of judicial powers enabled by the country's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, has gone this far and is likely, if not certainly, going to be enacted. The government controls the majority and have easily passed every Bill that it has introduced since it came into power in 1995, regardless of the opposition. The aim of the Judicial Accountability Act, in the words of the member who introduced it, is "to motivate lenient judges to give out tougher sentences" and this Act may lead to "performance reviews for judges". This would take away judicial discretion to tailor the sentence according to the nature of the crime and circumstances of the offender. This is where in the immediate sense; interference with the independence of the judiciary comes in. Judges will be intimidated into giving harsher sentences because of the fear that is created by the Act, they will give harsher sentences regardless of their fitness but merely in order to avoid their names being published as lenient judges. This is clearly pure harassment. The Attorney General has stated that information on sentences by judges is already publicly available thus there is no need to fear this legislation. If this is so, why create specific legislation to publish alleged lenient sentences, instead of pointing people to already available statistics. This rationale also flies in the face of public statements by the sponsor of the Bill who stated that the Bill is "to motivate lenient judges to give out tougher sentences" and this may lead to "performance reviews" of the judges. The government presumes sentences are lenient without taking into account the complexity of the sentencing process. Sentences in Ontario are in fact already harsher than in every other province of Canada. The broader "clear and present danger" posed by this Bill is that this government will start appointing political hacks, incompetents or mediocre lawyers to judgeships whose tenure will be accompanied by much repression and demise of the much valued canon of judicial independence. The administration of justice will also suffer ill repute. It goes without saying that I, as a lawyer, will be affected by this development, along with everyone in the legal profession and society as a whole. I represent "those who most intensely rely upon a free, efficient, altruistic, honest and wise system of justice", in the words of a former Judge of the Supreme Court of Brazil uttered at a CIJL seminar in Buenos Aires in 1988. My clients look to the judiciary and not to the legislature for protection and vindication of their rights and interests. I care for them that much to be able to take the unusual step of reporting the legislative developments in Ontario to your organization in the hope that your influence, if executed will stop this Bill in its tracks. The Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1985 adopted the historic Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, which called on governments to "respect and observe the independence of the judiciary" and to refrain from improper interferences and provide for the security of judges. In Ontario, Canada, the Judicial Accountability Act is a direct antithesis to the U.N. Basic Principles. The Federal government of Canada that has overall jurisdiction in criminal justice, but not in its administration, has been silent on the legislation unravelling in Ontario. The opposition parties in Ontario have voiced concerns and so have the Canadian Bar Association and the Law Society of Upper Canada (which governs the legal profession in Ontario) and individual lawyers. But as stated, this government controls the majority and has been able to pass any law it desired. External intervention may be the only voice this government listens to. My profession is also under threat. If judges are attacked today, then tomorrow it will be lawyers and citizens. The Seventh U.N. Congress recognized that "adequate protection of the rights of citizens requires that all persons have effective access to legal services provided by lawyers who are able to perform effectively their proper role in the defence of those rights, and to counsel and represent their clients in accordance with the law and their established professional standards and judgment without any undue interference from any quarter." The Judicial Accountability Act of Ontario directly imparts undue and political interference on the legal profession. Interference with the independence of the judiciary takes different forms in different countries. In other places, it includes breaking judges', lawyers', and legal workers' heads and legs or bombing their homes and offices. In Ontario it is taking the form of legislative legalese. The form of interference should not matter for the purpose of your intervention, as the end result of interference with the independence of the judiciary is the same -- the subversion of the administration of justice. Nor should the mechanisms available in each country' for preventing the interference with the independence of the judiciary matter, for the purpose of your intervention. I call on you to intervene to prevent the looming disaster on the judiciary and legal profession in Ontario. Under separate cover, I will send you documents and commentaries on the Judicial Accountability Act.
QL Update: 20050427
Book Review: Watt, D., & Fuerst, M. (1989). Tremeear's
Review by Munzonzwe
Hamalengwa, articling student, Ruby & [back to top of page] Practitioners of criminal law now have a choice as to which annotated Criminal Code they may take to the courtroom. Until now, there was no question that judges, prosecuting attorneys and defence counsel would take Martin's Criminal Code to the courtroom. Even though the annotations were sometimes long and cases were inserted in the middle or at the end of the annotation, (thus creating the possibility of missing a case), Martin's was attractively printed in bold letters. Now there is a new kid on the block, in the form of the new 1990 Tremeear's Criminal Code by Mr. Justice Watt and Ms. Michelle Fuerst. The old format of Tremeear's provided a useful research tool, but it was too long-winded and the print was too small. Moreover, it was organized in parts and volumes, which made it inconvenient to consult. The new format of Tremeear's is very well organized in one volume, and it includes after each section a short explanation of the principle of the section. (Martin's Criminal Code does not state the principles of the sections). There then follow the most important cases in which the section finds interpretation. Another difference from Martin's Criminal Code is that the cases are cited first and then followed by one to several sentences of annotation. If the section contains various elements of an offence, these elements are separately annotated. In addition, if the annotated section has related provisions within the Code, these are also mentioned at the end of the annotation. This makes it easier to obtain a complete picture of the issues that may be involved by reading one particular section. One of the most important and indeed now indispensable features of the new Tremeear's Criminal Code, and another difference from Martin's Criminal Code, is the annotation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Both the landmark Charter cases bearing on criminal law and the interpretation of Charter guarantees are annotated under the relevant section. A lawyer therefore now needs only one book to take to court. The annotation of the Charter in Tremeear's may now mean Martin's Criminal Code has to include this feature or risk the prospect of being consigned to the library rather than to the courtroom in the next several years. But the threat won't be very serious until the price of Tremeear's is cut. Right now it is too high compared to Martin's. QL Update: 20010102
|
[ View Guestbook | Munyonzwe Hamalengwa's Law Practice ]
Member of:
Criminal Lawyers Association The Law Society Of Upper Canada
Last Modified: August 15, 2007
Home ● Services ● Experience ● Articles ● Quicklaw Articles ● Book Review ● Publications
●Work in Progress ● Media Bits ● Link Sites ● Your Suggestions
Copyright @ 2005 by C&H